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COMMENT
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association: Government
Property Rights and the Free
Exercise Clause
Introduction
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment guarantees that
"Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of reli-
gion]." 1 In the past, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted
this clause to mean that religious practices are shielded from governmen-
tal interference absent a compelling regulatory interest.2 In a recent case,
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,3 however, the
Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not bar the federal
government from building a logging road in a national forest despite the
fact that this road "could have devastating effects on [nearby] traditional
Indian religious practices" by impairing the privacy and solitude of the
"high country" 4  needed by the Indians for satisfactory ritual
performance.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had upheld the district
court's injunction of the planned road.' In reversing the lower courts'
decisions, Justice O'Connor, writing for the five-to-three majority, ruled
that the Free Exercise Clause does not protect against "incidental effects
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See infra notes 97-144 and accompanying text.
3. 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
4. Id. at 1326. The Court's decision in Northwest Indian evoked quick opposition in the
press. See The Road to Perdition, Los Angeles Times, Apr. 26, 1988, at 4, col. 1; Religious
Rights: A Matter of Property, Wall St. J., May 20, 1988, at 18, col. 4; Religion Clauses of First
Amendment Divide Court Along Ideological Grounds, The Recorder, Sept. 6, 1988, at 10, col. 1.
Popular concern over the future of the affected tribes' religion prompted musical artists to
stage a Hollywood rock concert in September, 1988, the proceeds of which benefited the Na-
tive American Rights Fund to lobby on the Indians' behalf. See No G-O Road Concert to
Benefit Native American Rights Fund (PR Newswire, Sept. 1, 1988) (NEXIS, NEXIS library,
Omni file).
5. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n. v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D.
Cal. 1983), af'd, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n., 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
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of government programs, which may make it more difficult to practice
certain religions.",6 The Court ruled that the government's actions will
be subject to strict scrutiny only when the incidental effects of their pro-
grams either "coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious
beliefs,"7 or "penalize religious activity by denying any person an equal
share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens. '
Since the planned logging road would neither "coerce" nor "penalize"
the Indians for their beliefs, the road's effects on their religious prac-
tices-however disastrous they would be-were deemed constitutionally
irrelevant.9
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun,
dissented strongly. " 'Prohibit,'" the dissenters claimed, is "a compre-
hensive term that in no way suggests that the intended [Free Exercise
Clause] protection is aimed 'only at governmental actions that coerce af-
firmative conduct."1 They argued that "prohibit" should be broadly
construed to sanction government "laws that frustrate or inhibit religious
practice"'" unless the government can show a "compelling justification
for its proposed use of federal land."12
This Comment examines previous decisions of the Supreme Court in
order to discover whether the indirect effects of government programs on
the vitality of religious practices have been considered in determining
whether government actions impose an unconstitutional burden on the
free exercise of religion. Part I of this Comment will present the facts
and holding of the Northwest Indian majority, and the dissent's argument
for a broader interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. Part II then will
trace the origin and development of the Supreme Court's modern, two-
part test for an unconstitutional infringement of religious practice by
looking at those cases in which the Court has given constitutional signifi-
cance to the noncoercive, nonpenalizing effects of government programs
on religiously motivated conduct. Finally, Part III will assess the consti-
tutional analysis in Northwest Indian in light of the standards established
by precedent.
This Comment will conclude that the "incidental effects of govern-
ment programs"' 3 often have been of deep concern to the Supreme Court
in ruling whether government actions unconstitutionally infringe on the
rights of religious practitioners. 4 The modern, two-part test has typi-
6. Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at 1326. (Kennedy, J., did not take part in the decision).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1325.
9. See id. at 1326-27.
10. Id. at 1335 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11. Id. (emphasis in original).
12. Id. at 1338.
13. Id. at 1326.
14. See infra notes 97-144 and accompanying text.
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cally included an evaluation of the harm government programs would
inflict on the vitality of the religions affected."i By explicitly rejecting
this effects analysis in Northwest Indian, the Supreme Court refused to
recognize the indirect impact governmental action may have on religious
practice. 6 As Justice Brennan trenchantly observed in his Northwest In-
dian dissent, "[The majority's holding produces] the cruelly surreal re-
sult [that] governmental action that will virtually destroy a religion is
nevertheless deemed not to 'burden' that religion."1 7
I. Background
A. Facts
The Siskiyou mountains rise more than seven thousand feet above
the confluence of the Klamath River and Blue Creek in remote north-
western California. II The highest group of peaks and rocks, constituting
approximately twenty-five square miles, 9 is traditionally a sacred "high
country" for nearby Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians.20 "For at least
200 years and probably much longer,"'" tribal representatives have fol-
lowed a network of ancient paths into the high country,2 2 where, using
"prayer seats," they believe they communicate with primordial creative
spirits residing in the mountains and valleys around and below them.
Through silent, solitary meditation in the high country, Indian healers
and leaders acquire spiritual power or "medicine." Returning from the
peaks, they perform the "World Renewal" tribal ceremonies, "which
constitute the heart of the Northwest Indian religious belief system."
23
So important are the Indians' regular pilgrimages into the high country
that "[a]lthough few tribe members actually make medicine at the most
powerful sites, the entire tribe's welfare hinges on the success of the indi-
vidual practitioners."2 4 Making medicine is "site-specific." The Indians
must silently meditate at specific locations in the high country in order
15. See infra notes 110-144 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 47-52, 87-88 and accompanying text.
17. Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at 1337 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
18. P. MATTHIESSEN, INDIAN COUNTRY 165-99 (1984).
19. Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at 1330 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20. P. MATTHIESSEN, supra note 18, at 168.
21. Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at 1330 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22. The Yurok call the path-network thkla-mah, i.e., the ladder or steps into the sacred
"sky-world" of the high country. P. MATTHIESSEN, supra note 18, at 169.
23. Northwest Indian, 565 F. Supp. at 594. Individual members hike into the high coun-
try to acquire "curative powers for the healing of the sick, or personal medicine for particular
purposes such as good luck in singing, hunting, or love." Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct at 1331
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
24. Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at 1332 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Northwest Indian,
565 F. Supp. at 591-92.
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for medicine-making to have religious efficacy.25
The religious power [medicine makers] acquire in the high country
lends meaning to... tribal ceremonies, thereby enhancing the spir-
itual welfare of the entire tribal community .... For the Yurok,
Karok, and Tolowa peoples, the high country constitutes the
center of the spiritual world. No other geographic areas or sites
hold equivalent religious significance for these tribes.26
Thus, the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians cannot practice their reli-
gion outside the high country, and their beliefs and their tribal welfare
require that these sacred sites remain undisturbed.27
The high country constitutes the northeastern corner2" of what is
today the 76,500-acre Blue Creek Unit of Six Rivers National Forest (the
Forest).2 9 Chimney Rock is a prominent peak in the high country that
the Indians use as a sacred medicine site.30 In 1982, the United States
Forest Service gave final approval to a plan to pave a six-mile segment of
an existing dirt road traversing the Chimney Rock area.3' When paved,
the segment would complete the "G-0 road," a 75-mile-long roadway to
be used by logging trucks and automobiles traveling between the small
towns of Gasquet and Orleans, California.32 At the same time that the
Forest Service approved completion of the G-O road through Chimney
Rock, the Service adopted a management plan permitting the harvesting
of 733 million board feet of timber from the Blue Creek Unit over the
next 80 years.33
The federal government approved completion of the G-O road and
harvesting plans despite a 1979 preliminary Forest Service study recom-
mendation that the road not be completed. That study, based on exten-
sive consultation with affected tribes, urged the government to abandon
its plan because Indian religious rituals conducted at Chimney required
"privacy, silence, and an undisturbed natural setting," and construction
along any possible route "would cause serious and irreparable damage to
the sacred areas which are an integral and necessary part of belief sys-
tems and lifeway of Northwest California Indian peoples.",3
4
25. Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct at 1331 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The site-specific na-
ture of Indian religious practice derives from the Native American perception that land is itself
a sacred, living being.").
26. Northwest Indian, 565 F. Supp. at 591-92, 594 (citations omitted).
27. See id. at 594.
28. Id. at 591.
29. Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 689.
30. Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct at 1322.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1321.
33. Id. at 1332 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 1322 (quoting D. THEODORATUS, CULTURAL RESOURCES OF THE CHIMNEY
ROCK SECTION, GASQUET-ORLEANS ROAD, Six RIVERS NATIONAL FOREST (1979)).
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The final plan prepared by the Regional Forester and accepted by
the government selected the route farthest from "sites used by contempo-
rary Indians for specific spiritual activities,"35 and provided a one-half
mile protective zone around "eleven sites with identified historical and
ritual use."3 6 The final plan rejected as logistically and economically un-
feasible alternative routes that would have avoided Chimney Rock
altogether.
After exhausting their administrative remedies,38 Indian organiza-
tions, environmental groups, the State of California, and individuals peti-
tioned the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California for a permanent injunction against both completing the G-0
road and timber harvesting.39 The plaintiffs based their claim on the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which states that "Con-
gress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." '
After emphasizing the centrality of the Chimney Rock area to the prac-
tice of their religion, the Indians argued that the government's proposed
half-mile protective zones "would fail significantly to mitigate the ad-
verse visual, aural, and environmental impacts of logging activities on the
high country's salient religious characteristics."'" They claimed that (1)
by separating Chimney Rock from contiguous peaks, the G-0 road
would "damage the pristine visual conditions found in the high country
that are essential for its religious use"; (2) noise from road construction
and vehicular traffic would have a significant negative impact on religious
practices; (3) road construction would result in "environmental degrada-
tion," which would "erode the religious significance" of the Chimney
Rock area; and (4) "religious use of the area would be impaired by in-
creased recreational use resulting from construction of the Chimney
Rock Section."'42 The Indians asserted that the Free Exercise Clause pre-
cluded the Forest Service from completing the G-0 road and permitting
harvesting without first showing a compelling governmental interest that
could not be satisfied by means that did not burden the Indians' religious
practices.43
35. Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at 1322.
36. Northwest Indian, 795 F,2d at 694. See Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at 1322.
37. Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct at 1322. See Northwest Indian, 565 F. Supp. at 598-601.
38. Northwest Indian, 565 F. Supp. at 590.
39. Id. at 606.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
41. Northwest Indian, 565 F. Supp. at 592.
42. Id.
43. The district court also considered and rejected the Indians' claim that completion of
the Chimney Rock section would be in violation of the American Indian Religious Freedom
Act (AIRFA), a Congressional resolution stating that the United States endorses a policy "to
protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express,
and exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian... including but not limited to
access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through cere-
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In response, the government "concede[d] that the Indian plaintiffs'
use of the high country for religious practices [was] entitled to First
Amendment protection."'  The defendants argued, however, that the
government had an overriding interest in completing the G-O road. The
government cited several benefits of the proposed project. Completing
the road would provide greater access to the Forest for administrators,
recreational visitors, and timber harvesters. In addition, development of
the area's timber would stimulate employment in the region and generate
revenue for the federal government.45 The government argued that these
benefits amounted to a compelling interest that justified the indirect reli-
gious infringement that the road would cause.4 6
The Indian plaintiffs, at the outset, faced a discouraging trend in
federal court decisions concerning Native American religious rights.
Although state courts had upheld these rights over asserted government
interests,4" the federal courts had not been as receptive. Federal appel-
late courts found for the United States when the government sought to
develop a ski area, despite evidence that the increased tourist presence
would disturb natural sites held sacred by Hopi and Navaho Indians,
41
and when construction of a government road would result in an increase
of tourists next to Lakota and Tsistsistas ceremonial grounds. 49 Federal
appellate courts permitted the United States to flood Navajo sacred
springs and prayer sites"0 and the Cherokee ancestral town of Chota,51
all on federal land, to construct dams. 2
monials and traditional rites." 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982). See Northwest Indian, 565 F. Supp. at
597-98 (AIRFA's goals were satisfied when Forest Service agents planning the road took testi-
mony from Indian leaders to minimize harm to sacred sites).
44. Northwest Indian, 565 F. Supp. at 594.
45. Id. at 595.
46. See id. at 595-97.
47. State supreme courts have recognized a substantial burden on Native American reli-
gious practices and required the government to show justification for its interference when the
practices did not conflict with state land-use management. Thus, the Alaska Supreme Court
found that the interest of an Athabascan in providing moose meat for a funeral meal out-
weighed the State's interest in preventing poaching. Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska
1979). The California high court also balanced interests to find that the interest of a member
of the Native American Church in performing a peyote ritual outweighed the admittedly im-
portant State goal of drug control. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 69 (1964).
48. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1056 (1984).
49. Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
50. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
51. Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 953 (1980).
52. Federal appellate courts have considered and rejected the idea that individuals must
own property in order to assert a claim under the Free Exercise Clause. See Badoni, 638 F.2d
at 172; Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164. See generally, Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights
to the Use of Public Lands, 63 B.U.L. REV. 141 (1983); Stambor, Manifest Destiny and Ameri-
LYNG V NORTHWEST INDIAN
In Northwest Indian, however, the district court rejected the govern-
ment's assertion that its interests in completing the G-O road were com-
pelling and found for the Indian plaintiffs. 3 The Indians had
demonstrated that the pristine and undisturbed environment of the
Chimney Rock section was "central and indispensable" to their religious
practices and that the proposed governmental action would "burden the
free exercise of [their] religion."54 Balancing the demonstrated burden to
the Indians' first amendment rights against the government's asserted in-
terests in developing the Chimney Rock area, the district court found
that the government had failed to demonstrate an overriding justification
for paving the six-mile section of road. The lower court found that com-
pletion of the Chimney Rock section would neither improve access to
timber resources nor result in a net increase in regional jobs." Increased
recreational access by completing the road "[could] not support infringe-
ment of plaintiffs' First Amendment rights."' 56 The court concluded that
the government's remaining concerns (administrative efficiency, in-
creased revenues) "[fell] far short" of the very weighty interests required
to justify an infringement on the Indians' freedom of religion. 7
While the government's appeal to the Ninth Circuit was pending,
Congress enacted the California Wilderness Act of 1984.58 The Act pro-
hibited all timber harvesting throughout the Forest, exempting from its
wilderness designation only the six-mile strip of land required for com-
pleting the G-O road, "if the responsible authorities so decide."59 With
the volume of timber subject to harvesting substantially diminished, the
government's assertedly compelling interests-already rejected as inade-
quate by the lower court-failed to impress the appellate court and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a permanent injunc-
tion against the completion of the G-O road.60 The Indians had shown
that their religious practices would be significantly harmed, while the
government had failed to demonstrate a "compelling justification" for
can Indian Religious Freedom: Sequoyah, Badoni and the Drowned Gods, 10 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 59 (1982).
53. Northwest Indian, 565 F. Supp. at 591.
54. Id. at 594, 595. See Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164 (No claim that ancestral land had
"centrality or indispensability" to Cherokee religious observances held dispositive of Indians'
free exercise claim against government land development.).
55. Northwest Indian, 565 F. Supp. at 595-96.
56. Id. at 596.
57. Id.
58. California Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 98-425, 98 Stat. 1619 (1984).
59. Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at 1323.
60. Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d 688, 698 (9th Cir. 1986). The California Wilderness Act
rendered moot the lower court's requirement that the government prepare environmental im-
pact reports on the wilderness potential of the Blue Creek Unit and the effect of logging on
indigenous populations of anadromous fish. Accordingly, the court of appeal vacated those
portions of the district court's order.
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the road's completion.61
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the
merits of plaintiff Indians' first amendment claim.62 The Supreme Court,
ruling that the Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit the government's
proposed actions, reversed, and remanded the case to the district court
for reconsideration of the lower court's injunction.63
B. Majority Holding
The Northwest Indian majority recognized that completion of the G-
0 road would have serious and possibly fatal effects on the religious prac-
tices of the Indian plaintiffs. 64 Unlike the two lower courts, however, the
Supreme Court refused to balance the harm to the Indians' religious
practices against the government's interest in finishing the G-O road.
The Court ruled that the Constitution does not protect individuals from
indirect, adverse consequences of otherwise lawful government actions.
If balancing were required, the Indians could burden the government
with a religious servitude on its own land by showing that the adverse
effects to their religion outweighed the government's interest in develop-
ing its property. 65 In addition, a balancing test would require the judici-
ary to evaluate religious-truth claims.66 The Court found that the Free
Exercise Clause only prohibits the government from coercively compel-
ling believers to act contrary to the tenets of their faith, or penalizing
believers for performing their religious practices. Since the Indian plain-
tiffs did not allege coercion or penalization, they did not state a claim
under the Free Exercise Clause.67
The Northwest Indian majority conceded that the Indians' religious
beliefs were sincere" and their religious practices in the high country
were long-standing.6 9 The Court recognized that these practices were
"intimately and inextricably bound up with the unique features of the
Chimney Rock area...., 7 0 The Court recognized what the government
did not dispute, namely, that "the logging and road-building projects at
issue ... could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious
practices."'" The majority agreed that "the threat to the efficacy of at
least some religious practices is extremely grave," and accepted for pur-
61. Id. at 694-95.
62. Northwest Indian, 108 S.Ct. at 1324.
63. Id. at 1330.
64. See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
68. Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at 1324.
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poses of argument the Ninth Circuit's opinion that the G-O road will
" 'virtually destroy the Indians' ability to practice their religion.' "72
Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the First Amendment does not
require balancing the indirect adverse effects on religion against the gov-
ernment's interests. 73 "Even if we assume ... the Ninth's Circuit's pre-
diction [that the road] will 'virtually destroy the Indians' ability to
practice their religion' . . . the Constitution simply does not provide a
principle that could justify upholding respondents' legal claims."
74
In support of its ruling, the Court gave two reasons why first
amendment balancing of effects and interests would be inapplicable in
cases like Northwest Indian. First, constitutional recognition of indirect
adverse effects of government property use on religious practices would
permit the Indians to impose a "religious servitude" on Chimney Rock,
opening the way for a constitutional objection to the presence of anyone
in the area-"recreational visitors, other Indians, or forest rangers."'75
Unless the Court upheld the government's right to use its land, despite
the admitedly negative consequences to petitioners' religious practices,
accommodating Indian religious convictions "could easily require de
facto beneficial ownership of some rather spacious tracts of public prop-
erty.' 76 The result of the majority's analysis is a powerful vindication of
the government's right to use its property in any lawful manner it sees fit.
Justice O'Connor concluded, "Whatever rights the Indians may have to
the use of the area, however, those rights do not divest the Government
of its right to use what is, after all, its land."77
Second, the Court believed that application of a balancing test
would necessarily involve the judiciary in an inappropriate assessment of
the truth of believers' religious claims. According to the majority, since
courts "cannot determine the truth of the underlying [religious] beliefs
that [lead] to ... religious objections [, courts] cannot weigh the adverse
effects" of government programs on the spiritual welfare of religious ad-
herents.78 What is true of any one religious objector's beliefs is true of
all: courts have no access to religious truth and therefore have no stan-
dard for the comparison of competing religious views. The court con-
cluded that "[w]ithout the ability to make such comparisons, we cannot
say that ... one form of incidental interference with an individual's spiri-
tual activities should be subjected to a different constitutional analysis
than [an]other. ' ' 79 Again assuming that a constitutional analysis of gov-
72. Id. (quoting Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 693).
73. See id. at 1324.
74. Id. at 1326-27 (quoting Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 693).
75. Id. at 1327.
76. Id.
77. Id. (emphasis in the original).
78. Id. at 1325 (citations omitted).
79. Id.
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ernmental effects on religious practices requires a judicial determination
of unprovable religious beliefs, the court emphasized that the "location of
the line" between permissible government actions and impermissible
prohibitions on the free exercise of religion "cannot depend on measuring
the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual de-
velopment."' 0 Since courts cannot determine which indirect effective
burdens on religious practice deserve judicial relief and which do not
(because they cannot assess which practices reflect beliefs closer to divine
truth), the government need not provide a compelling justification for
conduct that "would significantly interfere with private persons' ability
to pursue spiritual fulfillment according to their own religious beliefs."'"
The Court distinguished two forms of government action that would
require justification. When religious adherents are coerced by govern-
ment programs into acting against their religious beliefs, or penalized by
being denied government benefits available to other citizens, the First
Amendment requires the government to show a compelling justification
for its conduct.8 2 Because the government's proposed land use in the
Chimney Rock area neither coerced nor penalized the Indians, the First
Amendment could not protect them from the effective destruction of
their religion by the government's programs.
[The scrutiny applied to] indirect coercions or penalties on the free
exercise of religion.... does not and cannot imply that the inciden-
tal effects of government programs, which may make it more diffi-
cult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to
coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, re-
quire government to bring forward a compelling justification for its
otherwise lawful actions."
C. Dissenting Opinion
The Brennan dissent, which Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined,
argued that the Free Exercise Clause required the Court to balance the
indirect harm to the Indians' religious practices against the government's
interests. Justice Brennan criticized the majority for departing from the
effects-oriented, "common-sense" 4 reading of the Free Exercise Clause
that the Court had adopted in the past. Indirect affirmative coercion of
80. Id. at 1326.
81. Id. at 1325.
82. Id. at 1326 ("[I]ndirect coercion or penalties on the free excercise of religion, not just
outright prohibitions, are subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment."). The Court's
analysis relies on Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). See infra notes 145-168 and accompany-
ing text.
83. Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at 1326.
84. Citing Webster's definition of "prohibit" ("to prevent from doing something") as evi-
dence of the majority's too-narrow interpretation of the free exercise guarantee, Justice Bren-
nan concluded, "Government action that frustrates or inhibits religious practice fits far more
comfortably within this definition than does the Court's affirmative compulsion test." WEB-
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believers, the dissenters argued, is just one way in which the government
has burdened religious practices in previous cases. In deciding those
cases, "we nowhere suggested that such coercive compulsion exhausted
the range of religious burdens recognized under the Free Exercise
Clause."85
Regarding the majority's contention that upholding the injunction
would permit the Indians to unilaterally resolve future conflicts in their
favor by invoking the Free Exercise Clause, Justice Brenann observed
that the issue of federal lands under " 'religious servitudes' . . . . is most
assuredly not before us today," and would not in any case excuse the
Court from making a constitutional analysis of the adverse effects of the
government's program on the Indians' religious practices in reaching its
decision.86 By refusing to balance the interests of the parties, "the Court
embrace[d] the Government's contention that its prerogative as land-
owner should always take precedence over a claim that a particular use
of federal property infringes religious practices." 7 As a result, the dis-
senters argued, "the Court has effectively bestowed on one party to this
conflict the unilateral authority to resolve all future disputes in its favor
"88
Justice Brennan rejected the majority's premise that assessment of
adverse effects would entail judicial evaluation of religious-truth claims.
Rather, "Native Americans would be the arbiters of which practices are
central to their faith, subject only to the normal requirement that their
claims be genuine and sincere."89
Addressing the majority's contention that any analysis of the effects
of government action on religious practices would require "measuring
• . . spiritual development,"9 the dissenting justices observed that the
Court had previously "recognized that laws that affect spiritual develop-
ment by impeding the integration of children into the religious commu-
nity or by increasing the expense of adherence to religious principles-in
STER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIoNARY 940 (1983); Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at
1335 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. Id. 'at 1334 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
86. Id. at 1339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 1333 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See W. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
236 (1988) (Canby, the author of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d
688 (9th Cir. 1986), argues that the Supreme Court's disposition of the case "presumably puts
an end to free exercise challenges of governmental development projects.").
88. Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at 1338 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 1339 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The centrality test is discussed and criticized in
Note, American Indian Sacred Religious Sites and Government Development: A Conventional
Analysis in an Unconventional Setting, 85 MICH. L. REv. 771, 783 (1987) ("In all [sacred site]
cases... American Indian plaintiffs readily demonstrated that they followed an actual religion
in which they sincerely believed."). See also Note, Indian Religious Freedom and Government
Development of Public Lands, 94 YALE L.J. 1447 (1985).
90. Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at 1326.
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short, laws that frustrate or inhibit religious practice-trigger the protec-
tions of the [Free Exercise Clause]." 91 In brief, prior decisions by the
Supreme Court required no judicial evaluation of spiritual development
to assess the effect of government action on religious practices.
Justice Brennan offered a balancing test that suggests that once reli-
gious "adherents challenging a proposed use of federal land" vouch for
the centrality of an affected practice, they bear the burden of showing
"that the [use] poses a substantial and realistic threat of frustrating their
religious practices. Once such a showing is made, the burden should
shift to the Government to come forward with a compelling state interest
sufficient to justify the infringement of those practices." 92
The dissenters believed that the majority's interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause was unjustifiably narrow. Justice Brennan stated,
" '[P]rohibit' [is] a comprehensive term that in no way suggests that the
intended protection is aimed only at governmental actions that coerce
affirmative conduct."93 Instead, protection under the First Amendment
should extend to governmental acts that effectively "prevent conduct
consistent with religious belief."94
According to the dissent, failure to reaffirm its own precedents led
the Court to the inequitable result that "a federal land-use decision that
promises to destroy an entire religion does not burden the practice of that
faith in a manner recognized by the Free Exercise Clause."95 Because
the majority unjustifiably narrowed the scope of free exercise clause pro-
tection, the dissent concluded, the Court's decision "fails utterly to ac-
cord with the dictates of the First Amendment.
96
II. Free Exercise Clause Precedents to Northwest Indian
A. Cantwell's "Shield"
The history of the Supreme Court's analysis of the Free Exercise
Clause supports the Northwest Indian dissent. The early history of free
exercise cases established the government's role as active protector of
religious diversity.97 The Supreme Court then provided a two-part test
for determining when government action unconstitutionally intruded
upon religious practice.9" Only recently has the manner of this intrusion
weighed in the balancing of these interests. 99 Indeed, the modern history
91. Id. at 1335 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in the original).
92. Id. at 1339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 1335 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 1340 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. See infra notes 101-109 and accompanying text.
98. See infra notes 110-144 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 145-168 and accompanying text.
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of free exercise clause analysis supports the contention of the Northwest
Indian dissent that the "effect" and not the "form" of government con-
straints on religious practice determine their constitutionality under the
First Amendment."°°
The Framers, by incorporating the Free Exercise Clause into the
First Amendment, intended "at the very least ... to guarantee freedom
of conscience by preventing any degree of compulsion in matters of be-
lief."101 Early in its discussion of the Free Exercise Clause, the Supreme
Court made a distinction between freedom to believe, which is absolutely
protected, and freedom to act on those beliefs, which the government
may regulate in the public interest."0 2 The Court first recognized that.the
Free Exercise Clause protects religious practices in certain circumstances
in 1940 in Cantwell v. Connecticut.03 In Cantwell, a Jehovah's Witness
was arrested for playing an anti-Catholic record to interested members of
the public without receiving city certification as a member of a religious
or philanthropic cause."° The Court ruled that the state law requiring
such certification violated his right to the free exercise of religion, and
noted that while the government may regulate religious activity, "[i]n
every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining
a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom [to act].' 0 5
Significantly, the Court emphasized that the purpose of first amend-
ment liberties is to foster, not merely tolerate, religious and political di-
versity.'06 Religious and political "liberties are, in the long view,
100. Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at 1334 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1160 (2d ed. 1988).
102. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (polygamy statute upheld against
Mormon who claimed polygamy was religious belief); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1943) (statute prohibiting public sale of magazines by minors upheld against parents' claim
that sale was mandated by their beliefs as Jehovah's Witnesses).
103. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). One year earlier, in Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164
(1939), the Court had ruled that the government must use the least restrictive means of achiev-
ing its lawful ends when "freedom of speech and press" are impaired by requiring permits to
distribute religious pamphlets. The Court did not mention the Free Exercise Clause.
104. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 301-02.
105. Id. at 304.
106. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) "[T]he Constitution [does not] re-
quire complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not
merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any .... Anything less would
require the 'callous indifference' we have said was never intended by the Establishment
Clause." Id. (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314, 315 (1952)) (citation omitted). See
also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemptions to religious organizations do
not violate Establishment Clause when regulation would result in government entanglement
with religion). But cf School Dist. of Abingdon Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
(majority cannot use government resources to require religious practices without violating Es-
tablishment Clause).
The deference that the Free Exercise Clause requires the government to show toward
religious conduct is based on the Founders' perception of the nonrational nature of religion
itself:
Spring 19891
496 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 16:483
essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citi-
zens of a democracy."'° 7 Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous court,
concluded, "The essential characteristic of these liberties is, that under
their shield many types of life, character, opinion and belief can develop
unmolested and unobstructed. Nowhere is this shield more necessary
than in our own country for a people composed of many races and of
many creeds." 10 8 Only when religiously-based conduct rises to the level
of "a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the State" by,
for example, inciting violence or breach of the peace, can a "narrowly
drawn" statute regulate religious practices.' 0 9
B. Modern Free Exercise Clause Analysis
1. Sherbert v. Verner
Although Cantwell established a "shield" of first amendment pro-
tection for religious activity, the Court had addressed only direct govern-
ment regulation of that activity. In 1963, the Supreme Court in Sherbert
v. Verner 10 considered the indirect effect that neutral government regu-
lations can have upon religious practice and constructed a test for evalu-
ating the validity of these regulations. In Sherbert, a Sabbatarian was
The religion clauses were designed to carve out the largest possible sphere where
individuals would be free to behave in accordance with the divine impulse and to
prevent the impulse from becoming an operative force in secular affairs. What differ-
entiates the religion clauses from the secular aspects of the First Amendment is the
founders' understanding that when human beings behave in response to the religious
impulse, they cannot be expected to maintain the levels of "reasonable" cost/benefit
behavior that can be demanded in the political sphere.
That perception underlies our extremely generous "pure effects-strict scrutiny"
free-exercise doctrine that, prior to Lyng always had forced government to justify any
behavior that had the effect of stifling worship.
Newborne, Religion Clauses of the First Amendment Divide Court Along Ideological Grounds,
The Recorder, Sept. 6, 1988, at 11, col. 4. On the recent history of the accommodation princi-
ple, see generally Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606,
1705-15 (1987); The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REV. 143,
232-42 (1988) (criticizing Northwest Indian for an insensitivity to nonmainstream religious
claims).
107. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 311. The Court, in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), invalidated
the application of a law requiring solicitors to purchase permits as against itinerant distributors
of religious pamphlets. The Court looked explicitly to the effect the law would have on "an
age-old type of evangelism," concluding that if the law were enforced, "[t]he spread of reli-
gious ideas through personal visitations by the literature ministry of numerous religious groups
would be stopped." Id. at 115. Laurence Tribe argues that taken together, Schneider,
Cantwell, and Murdoch "established the principle that even 'a regulation's unintended adverse
impact upon persons of a particular faith can invalidate it' as applied to them." L. TRIBE,
supra note 101, at 1254 n.23 (quoting Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Consti-
tutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1319 (1970)).
110. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). On the history of the pure effects-strict scrutiny doctrine, see L.
TRIBE, supra note 101, at 1251-75.
fired from her job after refusing to work on Saturdays."' The Court
ruled that a South Carolina statute, denying unemployment compensa-
tion benefits to anyone refusing to accept suitable work, violated her
rights under the Free Exercise Clause. t12 Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority, constructed a two-part test for unconstitutional govern-
mental interference with the free exercise of religion, first inquiring
whether the government regulation interfered with the claimant's reli-
gious practices and then weighing whether the government's interest jus-
tified this interference.
1 13
First, the Court asked "whether the disqualification for benefits im-
poses any burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion." '1 14 Justice
Brennan stated, as a general rule, that" '[i]f the purpose or effect of a law
is to impede the observance of one or all religions. . ., that law is consti-
tutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being
only indirect.' "115
The Sherbert Court found the South Carolina law indirectly bur-
dened the appellant's religious practices by forcing her "to choose be-
tween following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the
one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to
accept work, on the other hand.""' 6 The Court found that choice analo-
gous to "a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship."
'"17
Thus, because the South Carolina law "condition[ed] the availability of
benefits upon [the Sabbatarian's] willingness to violate a cardinal princi-
ple of her religious faith," the law substantially burdened her freedom of
religion.' 18
The Court therefore focused on the state's actions under the second
prong of the test, inquiring "whether some compelling state interest...
justifies the [government's] infringement of appellant's First Amendment
111. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410.
112. S.C. CODE ANN. § 68-114(3)(a)(ii) (Law. Co-op. 1962), providing in relevant part that
a claimant is ineligible for benefits, "[i]f... [she] has failed, without good cause... to accept
available suitable work when offered [her] by the employment office or the employer."
113. See infra notes 114-123 and accompanying text.
114. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
115. Id. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)) (emphasis added).
In Braunfeld, the Supreme Court, per Warren, C.J., rejected a claim by Orthodox Jewish
merchants that a Pennsylvania law requiring storekeepers to close on Sundays violated their
free exercise rights by depriving them of customers if they followed their religious precepts and
closed on Saturdays as well. The Court held that the Constitution did not prohibit an "indi-
rect economic burden" on religious practices that merely made it more expensive to follow
religious tenets. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606. The Court noted, however, that the Orthodox
merchants were "not faced with as serious a choice as forsaking their religious practices ......
Id. at 605.
116. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 406.
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right." '119 Even if the state showed a compelling interest, the Court
would require the government to "demonstrate that no alternative forms
of regulation would combat [unemployment compensation fraud] with-
out infringing First Amendment rights." 120 The Court noted that when
courts had found such compelling interests in the past, "[t]he conduct or
actions so regulated have invariably posed some substantial threat to
public safety, peace or order."121 In Sherbert, the government failed to
show a compelling state interest because it failed to prove that awarding
benefits to Sabbatarians who refused to work on their Sabbath would
dilute the compensation fund or disrupt employee scheduling.122 Conse-
quently, the Court did not proceed to ask whether less restrictive means
for achieving the state's purposes were available. 23
The particular adverse effect of the law at issue in Sherbert was the
government's indirect coercive compulsion of the Sabbatarian to her reli-
gious beliefs. The Supreme Court applied the Sherbert two-part test in
subsequent free exercise clause cases to establish the rule that the govern-
ment cannot unjustifiably condition receipt of benefits on an employee's
compliance with the law if compliance forces the employee to choose
between adhering to his or her religious beliefs and forfeiting unemploy-
ment benefits.1 24 The government cannot coerce a citizen to act in viola-
tion of his or her religious beliefs without a compelling justification, and
may only burden religious practices when the government shows that
119. Id.
120. Id. at 407. Accord Braunfeld, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (statute advancing compelling
state interest is valid "unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not
impose such a burden [on religious practice]" (citing Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296, 304-05 (1940));
see Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408-09 (distinguishing Braunfeld's conclusion that Sunday closing
law expressed compelling state interest in uniform day of rest for workers).
121. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)); see
also Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304, 310-11.
The Supreme Court has not applied strict scrutiny to the armed forces' interference with
the religious practices of its troops; the Court has required only a rational relation between the
military's constraints and its goals. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (Air
Force's perceived need for uniformity among troops sufficent to prevent Orthodox Jewish
rabbi, an officer, from wearing yarmulke); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983)
("courts are ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion
upon military authority might have"); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) ("the military
is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society"). Compare the military's
goal of maintaining a uniform appearance with the government's need to regulate its internal
affairs in a uniform manner. See infra notes 150-153 and accompanying text.
122. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
123. Id. at 407-09.
124. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (state cannot
deny unemployment benefits to Seventh Day Adventist-convert who refused to work on Satur-
day, her Sabbath); Thomas v. Review Board of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707
(1981) (state cannot deny unemployment benefits to pacifist Jehovah's Witness who quit rather
than work in munitions factory).
there are no less restrictive means of satisfying its interests. 125 The
Supreme Court refined and applied the Sherbert test, protecting religious
practices from all effective burdens that the government cannot justify,
nine years later in Wisconsin v. Yoder.
126
2. Wisconsin v. Yoder
Sherbert held that forcing citizens to choose between observing their
religion and receiving government benefits can indirectly and impermissi-
bly burden the free exercise of their religion. 12
7 In Wisconsin v. Yoder,12 8
the Court applied the Sherbert test to decide whether the government
can require citizens to do something that will effectively undermine both
their religion and their religiously-based community. The State of Wis-
consin convicted members of the Old Order Amish under a compulsory
school attendance law'2 9 after they refused to send their children to a
private school or enroll them in public school after the eighth grade.1
30
The State Supreme Court reversed and Wisconsin appealed. 3 ' A major-
ity of the United States Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Burger, held
that, despite the considerable interest of the state in educating its citizens,
the statute was unconstitutional as applied to the respondents because
their compliance would undermine the Amish community and its reli-
gious practices.
32
In applying the first prong of the Sherbert test, the Yoder Court
looked to the the effect and not the form of government action in deter-
mining whether a burden on religion existed. The Court observed that
"[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless
offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it
unduly burdens the free exercise of religion."'' 33 The Court therefore
looked closely at the relation between Amish faith, religious practice, and
community to decide whether compliance with the Wisconsin statute
would pose a serious threat to the survival of their religion. As deter-
mined by the trial court, and accepted by the Supreme Court, "Amish
communities today are characterized by a fundamental belief that salva-
tion requires life in a church community separate and apart from the
125. See infra notes 126-144 and accompanying text.
126. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
127. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
128. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
129. Wis. STAT. § 118.15 (1969), providing in relevant part, "(1)(a) [A]ny person having
under his control a child.., between the ages of 7 and 16 years shall cause such a child to
attend school.., until the end of the school term... in which [the child] becomes 16 years of
age .... (5) Whoever violates this section... may be fined not less than $5 nor more than $50
or imprisoned not more than 3 months or both."
130. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207-08.
131. Id. at 207.
132. Id. at 218.
133. Id. at 220. See Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at 1334 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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world and worldly influence... [and by] their devotion to a life in har-
mony with nature and the soil."' 134 Consequently, requiring Amish teen-
agers to attend modem American public schools, which stress "technical
knowledge[,] ... competition[,] ... [and] integration with[ ] contempo-
rary worldly society .... interposes a serious barrier to the integration of
the Amish child into the Amish religious community"1 3 5 and would "ul-
timately result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish church com-
munity as it exists in the United States today."
1 36
Significantly, the Court did not base its first-prong conclusion on a
finding that the Wisconsin law coercively compelled the Amish to choose
between public schools and criminal sanctions. Instead, the Court made
an analysis of the indirect adverse effects of public schooling on the fu-
ture of Amish religion, values, and culture, if respondents complied with
the law.
Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable reli-
gious sect . . ., the Amish in this case have convincingly demon-
strated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the interrelationship
of belief with their mode of life, the vital role that belief and daily
conduct play in the continued survival of Old Order Amish com-
munities and their religious organization, and the hazards
presented by the State's enforcement of a statute generally valid as
to others.
1 37
Having found that application of the attendance law would burden
the respondents' free religious exercise, the Court applied the second
prong of the Sherbert test and balanced the government's interests
against the likely harm to the Amish. The Court emphasized at the out-
set the significance of valid free exercise claims when it stated, "only
those [state] interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served
can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."'1 3' The
Court first defined the allegedly compelling interests the state sought to
advance by its compulsory school attendance law: preparation for re-
sponsible citizenship and self-sufficiency in society, 139 and noted that
134. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210.
135. Id. at 211-12.
136. Id. at 212. The Court found that Amish "religious faith and.., mode of life" were
"inseparable and interdependent," and that the infringed actions were "rooted in religious
belief." Id. at 215. In addition, the Court found that public schooling "by substantially inter-
fering with the religious development of the* Amish child and his integration into the way of
life of the Amish faith community... contravenes the basic religious tenets and practice of the
Amish faith .. " Id. at 218. The Court concluded that compulsory attendance "carries with
it a very real threat of undermining the Amish community and religious practice as they exist
today" and "would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents' religious
beliefs." Id. at 218, 219.
137. Id. at 235.
138. Id. at 215.
139. Id. at 221.
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"[p]roviding public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a
State.,"14
The Court ruled, however, that the quality of the Amish at-home
educational system rendered the state's regulatory interest less than com-
pelling. The Court found that the Amish system adequately prepared the
respondents' child for life in "the separated agrarian community that is
the keystone of the Amish faith,"' 4 1 and that it also prepared children to
fulfill "the social and political responsibilities of citizenship .... 142 Con-
sequently, "Wisconsin's interest in compelling the school attendance of
Amish children to age 16 emerges as somewhat less substantial than re-
quiring such attendance for children generally."' 43 Balancing the harm
to Amish religious practices against the injury to the state of Wisconsin,
the Court found the religious interests of the respondents superior, and
exempted them from compliance with the statute.
44
Cantwell, Sherbert, and Yoder exemplify the Supreme Court's tradi-
tion of shielding diverse religious practices from direct and indirect ad-
verse effects of government programs, when, on balance, the government
has not shown a compelling state interest that could not be satisfied by
less restrictive means. In 1986, the Court limited this protection in
Bowen v. Roy.
145
3. Bowen v. Roy
In Roy, the Supreme Court determined that some governmental reg-
ulations are not subject to strict scrutiny under Sherbert's second prong.
The State of Pennsylvania refused to provide two Native American par-
ents with benefits under Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) and Food Stamp programs when they failed to comply with
federal regulations 146 requiring that their minor daughter receive a Social
Security number. 147 The Roys sued the government, contending that ob-
taining and using a numerical identifier would violate their daughter's
rights under the Free Exercise Clause.4
The Supreme Court found that Mr. Roy, a Native American of
Abenaki descent, sincerely believed that obtaining a Social Security
number for his daughter (named Little Bird of the Snow), and the gov-
ernment's subsequent use of that number, would violate his religious
precepts and harm his child's spirit.
140. Id. at 213.
141. Id. at 222.
142. Id. at 225.
143. Id. at 228-29.
144. Id. at 235-36.
145. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
146. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25) (1976), 7 U.S.C. § 2025(e) (1976).
147. Roy, 476 U.S. at 695.
148. Id. at 696.
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In order to prepare his daughter for greater spiritual power [Roy
believed that] he must keep her person and spirit unique and that
the uniqueness of the Social Security number as an identifier, cou-
pled with the other uses of the number over which she [had] no
control, [would] 'rob the spirit' of his daughter and prevent her
from obtaining greater spiritual power."149
The government advanced an interest in "preventing fraud in...
benefits programs," '5 which, because of their "staggering magnitude"
and "tremendous administrative problems," ' could best be satisfied
through. assigning and using Social Security numbers. Congress left no
latitude to the states to permit individual exemptions to the contested
statutes in administering welfare funds, and affirmatively required poten-
tial recipients to provide the state with their Social Security numbers and
that of each household member.
1 52
The Court did not employ Sherbert balancing to decide the case. In
rejecting the Roys' claim, Chief Justice Burger emphasized that the gov-
ernment enjoyed wide latitude in the regulation of its "internal affairs":
The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require
the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that
comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens....
... Roy may no more prevail on his religious objection to the
Government's use of a Social Security number for his daughter
than he could on a sincere religious objection to the size or color of
the Government's filing cabinets.
1 53
After determining that indirect burdens on religion caused by the
government's management of its internal affairs do not implicate the Free
Exercise Clause, Chief Justice Burger went on to specify a narrow range
of government burdens that would raise the constitutional question. In a
separate part of his opinion, joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, 5 '
Chief Justice Burger concluded that only affirmative compulsion and
criminal penalization are inappropriate means of gaining the compliance
of religious objectors. The Chief Justice stated, "[G]overnment regula-
tion that indirectly and incidentally calls for a choice between securing a
149. Id.
150. Id. at 709.
151. Id. at 710. The Court noted that "[e]ach year roughly 3.8 million families receive $7.8
billion through federally funded AFDC programs and 20 million persons receive $11 billion in
food stamps." Id.
152. See id. at 708-09.
153. Id. at 699-700. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (on Sherbert balancing,
government interest in uniform application of Social Security system outweighed Amish em-
ployer's religious burden of complying with withholding requirement).
154. See Roy, 476 U.S. at 701-12 (Part III) (Blackmun, J., concurring in Parts I and II;
O'Connor, J., concurring in Parts I and II and dissenting in part, joined by Brennan and
Marshall, JJ.; Stevens, J., concurring in Parts I and II and concurring in the judgment; White,
J., dissenting).
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governmental benefit and adherence to religious beliefs is wholly different
from governmental action or legislation that criminalizes religiously in-
spired activity or inescapably compels conduct that some find objectiona-
ble for religious reasons." 155
Conversely, a statute "wholly neutral in religious terms and uni-
formly applicable" that does not affirmatively coerce or penalize religious
practices will not be constitutionally problematic, even though a law
"may indeed confront some applicants for benefits with choices. "156
Although Chief Justice Burger believed some "government compulsion
[was] involved"'5 7 in conditioning the Roys' receipt of benefits on their
compliance with the statutes, the compulsion did not rise to the level of
constitutional significance because the laws in question were facially neu-
tral, and therefore "of a wholly different, less intrusive nature than af-
firmative compulsion or prohibition, by threat of penal sanctions."
1 58
The Chief Justice, in the minority section of his opinion, next devel-
oped a standard for review of government regulation that burdens the
free exercise of religion. The Burger opinion departed from the Court's
precedents by announcing that "the nature of the burden is relevant to
the standard the government must-meet to justify the burden."' 59 Chief
Justice Burger explicitly rejected the application of the stringent Sherbert
test, as refined by Yoder, to the case, in favor of a lower, "legitimate
interest/rational means test."'160 He went on to state, "The test applied
in cases like [Yoder] is not appropriate in this setting. In the enforcement
of a facially neutral and uniformly applicable requirement for ... welfare
programs.., reaching many millions of people, the Government is enti-
tled to wide latitude." 1 6 1 When the government sets a requirement for
financial benefits, "neutral and uniform in its application," it is disposi-
tive of the issue if the government shows it has selected "a reasonable
means of promoting a legitimate public interest."'162 Accordingly, the
Court held that "the Government [need not] justify enforcement of the
use of Social Security number requirement as the least restrictive means
of accomplishing a compelling state interest." 63 Chief Justice Burger de-
clared that when the burden is not caused by inescapable coercion or
penalization, the Sherbert test is inappropriate, and the government need
only show a legitimate goal and a rational means to justify its
155. Id. at 706.
156. Id. at 703.
157. Id. at 704.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 707.
160. Id. at 729 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
161. Id. at 707.
162. Id. at 708.
163. Id. at 707.
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program. 1
64
One year after Roy, on facts virtually identical to those of Sher-
bert,' 65 the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the second half of Chief
Justice Burger's analysis and reaffirmed strict scrutiny as the standard of
review for all government actions that burden religious practice.' 66 In
Northwest Indian, however, Justice O'Connor embraced the first half of
Chief Justice Burger's innovation and accepted Roy's attenuation of free
exercise clause prohibitions to coercive compulsion and penalization,
thereby continuing her predecessor's misunderstanding of the Court's
tradition of accommodation of religious practices.1 61 Consequently, the
Court restored strict scrutiny, but the range of prohibited conduct still
excluded noncoercive effective burdens such as those threatening the
Northwest Indian plaintiffs. Roy therefore stands for the narrow proposi-
tion that a facially neutral law that indirectly burdens the free exercise of
religion should not be subjected to strict scrutiny if the law pertains to
the government's regulation of its internal affairs and does not affirma-
tively compel religious objectors to violate their beliefs.'
68
III. Criticism of Northwest Indian's Constitutional Analysis
Early and modern analyses of the Free Exercise Clause from
Cantwell to Yoder shared the conviction that the First Amendment for-
bids any unjustified government actions that effectively burden the free
exercise of religion.' 69 Breaking with precedent without explanation,
Roy attenuated free exercise clause prohibitions to those governmental
acts that coerce compliance by threatening economic or criminal penal-
ties.' 70 Roy's innovation subsequently yielded the harsh result in North-
west Indian."' Properly interpreted, however, Roy's restrictions apply
only to situations in which a religion is not at stake and the government
is seeking to manage its internal affairs in an efficient and fraud-resistant
manner." 2 Instead of applying Roy's narrow rule, the Northwest Indian
164. Id. at 707-08.
165. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Coim'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (Brennan, J., joined
by White, Marshall, Blackmun, O'Connor, and Scalia, JJ.; Powell and Stevens, concurring in
the judgment; Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see supra note 124.
166. Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141-42 ("[The legitimate interest/rational means] test has no basis
in precedent and relegates a serious First Amendment value to the barest level of minimal
scrutiny that the Equal Protection Clause already provides."(quoting Roy, 476 U.S. at 727
(O'Connor, J., dissenting in part)).
167. See supra notes 82-83, 97-144 and accompanying text.
168. See Hobble, 480 U.S. at 141-42 (rejecting reasonable-means standard for neutral, gov-
ernmental benefits laws); Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at 1336-37 (Brennan, 3., dissenting)
(limiting Roy's holding to federal management of internal affairs).
169. See supra notes 97-144 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 145-168, and infra notes 175-182 and accompanying text.
171. See infra notes 183-184 and accompanying text.
172. See infra notes 185-195 and accompanying text.
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majority should have adopted Yoder's effects analysis. If it had, the
Court would have addressed the complex issues of religious truth and
religious servitudes in a more satisfactory way than it did.173 Finally, if
the Court had applied the traditional effects analysis, as modified by Jus-
tice Brennan, the Court probably would have decided Northwest Indian
in favor of the Native American plaintiffs.' 74
A. Roy's Holding Misconstrued
The Northwest Indian majority relied heavily on Roy to establish
that the Free Exercise Clause forbids only outright prohibitions of reli-
gion and the government's coercive compulsion or penalization of believ-
ers.1 75 The Supreme Court's analysis in Roy, and its application of Roy
to the facts of Northwest Indian, however, are subject to criticism.
First, Roy itself was wrongly decided. The Burger majority departed
from established precedent that suggested that the range of impermissible
government burdens on religion was not limited to coercive compulsion
and penalization.'76 Chief Justice Burger's analysis limited the scope of
governmental conduct imposing an unconstitutional burden on religious
practice to the two forms of affirmative ("inescapabl[e]") 17 7 compulsion
to violate religious precepts, and criminal penalties for religiously-moti-
vated unlawful conduct. As Justice Brennan pointed out in his North-
west Indian dissent, however, the Court in Sherbert and subsequent cases
"nowhere suggested that such coercive compulsion exhausted the range
of religious burdens recognized under the Free Exercise Clause.' 78 The
standard that the Sherbert Court adopted required that if a government
program impeded religious practices in any way, including but not lim-
ited to the impediments of coercion or penalization, that program was
subject to constitutional analysis; indeed, "[i]f the ... effect of a law is to
impede the observance of one or all religions. . ., that law is constitution-
ally invalid even though the burden [is] indirect."'' 79 By protecting reli-
gious practices from both direct and indirect adverse effects of
government actions, the Court in Sherbert adhered to Cantwell's concept
of first amendment liberties as a "shield" beneath which "many types of
life, character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested and unob-
structed." 8 Sherbert and Yoder, like Roy, both analyzed facially neutral
laws with universal application (unemployment compensation and school
attendance laws), but recognized explicitly that "any burden" on reli-
173. See infra notes 196-210 and accompanying text.
174. See infra notes 211-214 and accompanying text.
175. See Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at 1326.
176. See supra notes 97-144 and accompanying text.
177. Roy, 476 U.S. at 706.
178. Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at 1334 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
179. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607.
180. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310.
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gious activity,"' or "mode of life" sustained by that activity, 182 was sub-
ject to scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause. By adopting Chief
Justice Burger's analysis, the majority in Roy restricted without justifica-
tion the scope of governmental burdens traditionally recognized by the
Supreme Court in its analysis of claims under the Free Exercise Clause.
The result of this unprecedented attenuation is the absurd result in
Northwest Indian. The Northwest Indian majority's lopsided balancing
test would strictly scrutinize an unemployment compensation law if one
Sabbatarian were refused benefits, but would sacrifice an entire religion
for a marginally useful road merely on the state's showing of the road's
reasonable relation to a legitimate purpose. As Justice Brennan observed
in his dissent, such a result is "cruelly surreal,"' 83 and "fails utterly to
accord with the dictates of the First Amendment" 184 as it has been inter-
preted in this century.
Second, Roy's narrow holding was misapplied in Northwest In-
dian.185 The religious objectors in Roy did not claim that the future of
their religion hinged upon the lower court's decision. Rather, they as-
serted that, after conversation with their religious leader, they had come
to believe that use of a Social Security number would "prevent [their
daughter] from attaining greater spiritual power." '186 The Supreme
Court has never ruled on a case in which nonreceipt of government bene-
fits would effectively destroy a religion. '87 If Roy's application is meant to
be restricted to financial benefits cases where a religion is not endangered
by government action, the Northwest Indian Court wrongly extended
Roy's holding in denying the injunction of the G-O road. Abenaki reli-
gious faith and practices would not be ended by the Roys' nonreceipt of
benefits, but the completion of the G-O road would, by the Northwest
Indian majority's own admission, probably result in the destruction of
the Tolowa, Yurok, and Karok Indians' religion.
188
Moreover, the Roy Court stressed that its holding addressed the
religious objectors' attempts to influence "the conduct of the Govern-
181. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
182. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
183. Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at 1337 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 1340 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
185. See infra notes 186-195 and accompanying text.
186. Roy, 476 U.S. at 696.
187. Justice Burger, in support of his minority opinion in Roy, quoted the Court's observa-
tion in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983) (rejecting private
school's free exercise clause claim of tax exempt status), that "[d]enial of tax benefits will
inevitably have a substantial impact on the operation of private religious schools, but will not
prevent those schools from observing their religious tenets." Roy, 476 U.S. at 706 (emphasis
added). Hence, if deprivation of aid threatened to stop the schools' religious practices alto-
gether, even Justice Burger might have conceded that the government's action implicated the
concerns of the Free Exercise Clause.
188. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
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ment's internal procedures."' 89 As Justice Brennan argued in his North-
west Indian dissent, however, "Federal land-use decisions, by contrast,
are likely to have substantial external effects that government decisions
concerning office furniture and information storage obviously will
not.""9 He stated, "[F]ederal land-use decisions are fundamentally dif-
ferent from government decisions concerning information management,
and .... under Roy, this difference in external effects is of constitutional
magnitude."'' It was precisely the external effects of government land-
management programs (namely, aural and visual alterations of the Chim-
ney Rock environment caused by the G-O road) that brought the North-
west Indian plaintiffs into court. The Court wrongly applied Roy's
deference to the government in the conduct of its internal affairs to the
facts of Northwest Indian. Instead, the government's interests should
have been subject to the two-part test enunciated in Sherbert and adopted
in Yoder.' 92
Finally, the Supreme Court based Roy's explicit exception to its
traditional balancing test on the government's need for "wide latitude" in
the "administration of welfare programs' ' 193 to counter possible fraud in
the nationwide system of public assistance. 94 In Northwest Indian, the
underlying policy goal of preventing fraud was absent. In addition, the
government faced none of the "staggering[,] .... tremendous administra-
tive problems"' 95 associated with providing benefits to millions of citi-
zens. Absent the government's need for unusually broad latitude in
preventing fraud among millions of aid recipients, the Court in Northwest
Indian had no reason not to follow stare decisis and apply the judiciary's
traditional balancing test of affected interests.
B. Yoder's Effects Analysis Ignored
Supreme Court precedents before Roy established the longstanding
application of a two-part test for the government's unconstitutional inter-
ference with religious practices. Yoder should have provided the touch-
stone for the Court's application of this test in Northwest Indian because
the legal issues and facts of the two cases were similar in several repects.
189. Roy, 476 U.S. at 700.
190. Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at 1336 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan viewed
AIRFA as "an express congressional determination that federal land management decisions
are not 'internal' government 'procedures,' but are instead governmental actions that can and
indeed are likely to burden Native American religious practices." Id. at 1337 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
191. Id. at 1337 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
192. See supra notes 110-144 and accompanying text.
193. Roy, 476 U.S. at 707.
194. Id. at 709.
195. Id. at 710.
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The law at issue in Northwest Indian permitting harvesting and road
building was, like Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law,
facially neutral. In both cases, events outside the contemplation of the
legislature-the effectiveness of the Amish at-home educational system
in preparing Amish youth for productive citizenship,196 and the Califor-
nia Wilderness Act of 1984 (removing most area timber from harvesting)
subsequent to adoption of the 1982 Forest Service study (approving com-
pletion of the Chimney Rock section of the G-O road)-diminished the
government's interest in applying otherwise valid laws. 197 Moreover, like
those of the Amish, the three Indian tribes' centuries-old religious prac-
tices would be undermined if the government put its plan into effect.
Like the Amish, the affected group in Northwest Indian was a small,
well-defined segment of the general population whose mode of life was
intimately related to its religious practices.
The majority in Northwest Indian asserted that "if the statute at is-
sue [in Yoder] had not been coercive in nature,"' 98 its effect on the Amish
would not have been constitutionally problematic. In Northwest Indian,
however, the majority failed to address the Yoder Court's extensive in-
quiry into "the interrelationship [between Amish beliefs and] their mode
of life, the vital role that belief and daily conduct play in the continued
survival of Old Order Amish communities and their religious organiza-
tion, and the hazards presented by the State's enforcement of a statute
generally valid as to others."' 199 The Yoder Court examined the harmful
consequences of Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law on
Amish society and religious practice because, in the tradition of
Cantwell, the majority believed that the scope of free exercise clause
prohibitions exceeded coercion and extended to government programs
having a negative "impact" on the livelihood of religious practices.2°°
Moreover, Yoder made clear that the Free Exercise Clause protects not
only specific religious practices from unwarranted interference, but
"modes of life" that are "inseparable" from those practices as well. 20 1
Yoder confirms that Cantwell's "shield" of the First Amendment oper-
196. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 224 (Wisconsin "mistaken[ly] assum[es] ... the Amish do not
provide any education.. .beyond the eighth grade, but allow them to grow in 'ignorance.' ").
197. See Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 692-93 ("Because most of the high country has now
been designated by Congress as a wilderness area, the issue of logging becomes less significant,
although it does not disappear.").
198. Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at 1329 ("[T]here is nothing whatsoever in the Yoder
opinion to support the proposition that the 'impact' on the Amish religion would have been
constitutionally problematic if the statute at issue had not been coercive in nature.").
199. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235.
200. Id. at 209. "Admittedly, this threat [to the Amish community and religious practice]
arose from the compulsory nature of the law at issue, but it was the 'impact' on the religious
practice itself, not the source of that impact, that led us to invalidate the law." Northwest
Indian, 108 S. Ct at 1334 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
201. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
ates in two directions: against a broad range of unjustified governmental
interference (including coercive compulsion) and for the benefit of di-
verse religious belief systems and their inseparable modes of life (includ-
ing specific religious practices).20 2
The Northwest Indian Court refused to recognize effective burdens
on religious practices, in part because it feared judicial adjudication of
religious-truth claims.20 3 Yoder's analysis of the affected religious inter-
ests should have shown the Northwest Indian Court that its fears were
unfounded. Faced with a similar challenge, the Yoder Court rightly fo-
cused on whether application of the law would make Amish practices
more difficult, not whether Amish theology was true. Testimony at trial
by expert witnesses established connections between Amish beliefs and
practices, and drew credible inferences as to the probable effect of the
government's action on the respondents' religious practices and mode of
life if they complied with the law.2° Whether or to what degree the
views of the Amish coincided with divine truth was never an issue in
determining if application of the state's school attendance law would bur-
den their religious practices.
Justice Brennan in Northwest Indian offered a standard for evaluat-
ing the impact of government actions on religion that was consistent with
the Court's analysis in Yoder.205 He urged the Court to permit the Indi-
ans, first, to decide which of their practices were central to their religious
beliefs and, second, to show "that [a] federal land-use decision poses a
substantial and realistic threat of undermining or frustrating their reli-
gious practices. ' 20 6 The Brennan dissent avoided judicial assessment of
the truth of religious claims, while providing a sound method by which
the adverse impact of government programs on religious practices may
be determined.
The Northwest Indian Court also hesitated to adopt Yoder's effects
analysis because it feared that a ruling in favor of the Indian plaintiffs
would result in a "religious servitude" on government property.20 7
Although the Court did not define its terms, a servitude is generally de-
fined as "a charge or burden resting upon one estate for the benefit or
advantage of another. ' 20 8 Tagging the Indians' interest in Chimney
Rock a "religious servitude," however, only restated the Indians' as-
serted free exercise interest in the use of land owned by another (in this
case, the government). Having marked the Indians' claims as an at-
tempted "religious servitude," the Court decided without argument that
202. See supra notes 97-144 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
204. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209-13.
205. See Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at 1338-39 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 1339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 1327.
208. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1229 (5th ed. 1979).
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the government's interests as landowner must take precedence over the
Indians' claims under the First Amendment.20 9 Although a nuanced
evaluation of the Indians' claims would certainly consider the origin and
constitutional limits of religiously-motivated interests in the use of gov-
ernment land, the Northwest Indian majority failed to provide an analysis
in reaching its uncritical result in favor of the government's right to de-
velop the Chimney Rock section.210 The answer to the Court's fear of
limitless claims by site-specific religious objectors is not the rejection of
Yoder's effects analysis. On the contrary, the solution is precisely the
careful, case-by-case balancing of alleged harm to religious practices
against the weight of governmental interests performed by the Supreme
Court in free exercise cases prior to Roy.
If the Court had applied Justice Brennan's version of the Yoder ef-
fects analysis21 1 to the facts of Northwest Indian, it would have con-
cluded that the permanent injunction of the government's proposed road
should be upheld. Justice Brennan's test reveals the following: (1) the
Forest Service's own study found that the Indians' sincerely believed that
the Chimney Rock section was central to their religious practices, thus
satisfying Justice Brennan's preliminary "centrality" requirement;212 (2)
"uncontradicted evidence" established that the proposed government ac-
tion "render the practice of respondents' religion impossible," thereby
obviously creating a risk of substantial harm to central religious practices
and burdening respondents' free religious exercise; 213 (3) the govern-
ment's interest was weak because the G-O road "had only the most mar-
ginal and speculative utility ' 214 for serving the now-reduced lumber and
tourist traffic in the Forest area. Balancing the interests, the government
presents a reasonable plan for facilitating regional industry and vehicular
traffic, but not a compelling justification for effectively destroying the In-
dians' religion. Since on balance the Indians' interests are weightier than
those of the government, the Court would not need to consider whether
less restrictive alternatives to the G-O road existed. Thus, Justice Bren-
nan's test leads to the conclusion that the permanent injunction granted
by the district court should have stopped the G-O road.
Conclusion
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, the
Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not protect reli-
gious practices against the adverse effects of government programs that
209. See Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at 1327.
210. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
212. Northwest Indian, 108 S. Ct. at 1338-39 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 1339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
214. Id.
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do not penalize or coerce believers to act contrary to their faith, even
though the probable result of the government's actions would be the de-
struction of the believers' religion.
This Comment has shown, however, that the Northwest Indian ma-
jority failed to address or distinguish key Supreme Court decisions sup-
porting a flexible and expansive interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause. These decisions consider noncoercive, nonpunitive effects of gov-
ernment actions on religious practices in determining whether the gov-
ernment must justify its interference with religion. The particular effects
of coercive compulsion and penalization are nonexhaustive examples of
the ways in which the First Amendment forbids unjustified government
infringement of sincerely held religious beliefs and practices.
The Northwest Indian majority applied the Court's holding in
Bowen v. Roy, namely, that free exercise prohibitions are limited to gov-
ernment criminalization of religion or coercive compulsion of believers in
order to gain their compliance with the law. The Northwest Indian ma-
jority misapplied Roy to permit construction of a road across government
land when the probable consequence would be the destruction of a Na-
tive American religion.
By refusing to balance the adverse effects of government land use on
religious practices against the strength of the government's asserted in-
terests, Northwest Indian effectively made government land ownership an
absolute defense to future claims of infringement on freedom of religious
practice. By limiting the kind of government actions that could consti-
tute a burden on the free exercise of religion to coercive compulsion and
penalization, the Supreme Court in Northwest Indian departed from es-
tablished precedent and wrongly constricted the scope of first amend-
ment protection of religiously-motivated conduct.
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